1)      1. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1061 (2010).

a.       The modern perception is that judicial elections weaken judges and the rule of law. Some critics of judicial power in the early republic supported judicial elections for precisely those reasons, but instead, they focused on other more direct attacks on the courts.  Judicial elections swept the country in the late 1840s and 1850s and the key was a new movement to limit legislative power, to increase judicial power, and to strengthen judicial review. Nineteen states called constitutional conventions from 1844 to 1853, where these conventions adopted judicial elections. Elected judges in the 1850s struck down many more state laws than their appointed predecessors.  Oddly, the first generation of elected judges were the first to justify judicial review in countermajoritarian terms, in the defense of individual and minority rights against abusive majorities and the “evils” of democracy. This Article concludes with lessons about judicial independence and democracy from this story.

2)      2. James J. Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 Drake L. Rev. 787 (2010).

a.       This Article notes that while recusal practices have certainly been one focal point of developments in the states, Caperton has also provided a significant boost to judicial public financing. After considering tangible developments in the three identified states, this Article briefly points to more nascent judicial independence efforts in other states, in which Caperton connections are less direct, but where the case is nonetheless figuring prominently in rejuvenated efforts to modify judicial selection practices. The Article asserts that, while not all of the post-Caperton developments have improved the judicial impartiality landscape, on balance, the decision is already producing meaningful improvements in protecting the courts from the influence of money.

3)      3. James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts, Extraordinary Case: The Sui Generis Recusal Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 305 (2010).

a.       This article argues that the scope of Caperton ought to be extremely limited indeed, limited to the facts of the Caperton case itself-in light of the extraordinary nature of case, the structure and language of the decision, and prior Supreme Court precedent. To that end, Part I will discuss some preliminary considerations regarding judicial elections and due process. Part II will analyze the facts and holding of the Caperton decision. Part III will present the perceived scope of the decision. Part IV will demonstrate the narrow scope of the decision. Part V will discuss the likely, though perhaps unintended, ramifications of the Caperton decision.

4)      4. James J. Sample, Caperton:  Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 293 (2010).

a.       This article asserts that Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. is correct in result; correct in its narrowness; and correct in calling on courts to be more rigorous in recusal than due process requires. The article argues that Caperton is a model of judicial restraint and that, paradoxically for a decision overturning a state justice's non-recusal, the majority's approach is a model of cooperative federalism. Second, the article asserts that the breadth of support for the petitioners in Caperton, combined with state-level developments in the decision's aftermath, support the proposition that the decision's greatest impact will be not as dispositive precedent in itself, but in spurring greater vigilance in recusal, both systemically and among individual jurists.

5)      5. Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics after Caperton, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 229 (2010).

a.       In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court recently found that an elected appellate judge’s participation in a company’s appeal violated due process in light of the substantial financial contributions made by the company’s chairman toward the judge’s election. The Court explained that “there is a serious risk of actual bias” on the judge’s part when, as here, “a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case.” The dissenting Justices targeted the vagueness of the Court’s standard, predicting that it would result in a flood of recusal motions which would bring the judicial process into disrepute. This Essay examines the dissent’s prediction and offers a host of reasons why it is unlikely to come true.

6)      6. Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Procuring “Justice”?:  Citizens United, Caperton v. Massey and Partisan Judicial Elections,  95 Iowa L. Rev. (2010) (forthcoming).

a.      This Essay seeks to make sense of this confluence of Supreme Court decision making and recent empirical evidence. In examining this intermingling and its potential repercussions, Part II briefly considers several of the more disquieting of Professor LeRoy’s findings in Partisan Election of Judges: Equal Justice? Part III reviews the holding of the controversial Citizens United in light of LeRoy’s empirical report. Part IV examines the Caperton v. Massey decision, and queries whether it will have any protective influence in connection with corporate influence over the partisan judicial election process. Part V interrogates the consequences of LeRoy’s study, Citizens United and Caperton.